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Abstract 
The governance of network IT has become more prominent in the last decade by 
arising new technologies like crowd sourcing, open source and cloud-computing. This 
challenge IT-governance.  
This paper assesses the implications of a network governance for IT. 
The presented theoretical model helps to understand how companies should use arising 
new technologies, which tasks are suited for network-driven IT-applicaitons. The 
model enables to understand the tension between technical possibilities and 
institutional boundaries related to demand uncertainty, task complexity, human asset 
specifity and frequency.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Current governance practices are questioned by arising new international networks 
driven by changing institutional conditions such as the application of new ICT-
technologies. A global economy is arising in which new technologies change sector 
conditions. Within the ‘new’ economy coordination mechanisms need to be redefined 
and hybrid governance mechanism seem to appear (Elsner (2004).  
Critical in this development is network IT, ICT applications that enable users to share 
information, work together across boarders, co-develop products, and off-shore and 
outsource business processes. All forms of knowledge transfer are directly affected by 
network driven IT in which it is not always clear who is the owner of what and related 
to that, who can control what. The platform, the software, the applications of the 
software, the exchange of information and the knowledge creation is in the hands of 
many.   
Currently, academics and practitioners are struggling with how to create new 
interdependencies and, related to that, new coordinating mechanisms (Elsner 2004). 
Until now many popular authors focus on the opportunities, using examples as the 
Linux, Apple Apps and Google Android as example how companies use ICT to 
innovate by co-developing products. Companies do not only benefit from new ICT-
applications, but have their struggles also 
 
 
  
 In this paper we combine current theory on network governance (Jones et. al. 1997), 
with new insights within interorganizational cooperation within IT-governance 
(Ibrahim & Ribbers 2009).  
 
By developing a new model in which the adoption an governance of Network IT 
adoption can be assessed, we try to give insight in what types of task are suitable 
for a networked collaboration approach, and what type of mechanisms allow 
networked collaborations to be effective?  
 
In this, we take a governance perspective. Governance indicates a set of – formal or 
informal – processes and decision rights that together support accountability (Jones 
1997, De Graaf Herkstroter 2007). How should the topmanagement assess the 
relevance of certain network IT-solutions based on the objectives of the company and 
which the tasks - that should be performed to reach these objectives- need network IT-
solutions, are governance questions.  Within this governance perspective, we assume 
that the board will try to create new fruitful interdependencies, without become solely 
dependent of forces they do not know and do not control. The should be able to assess 
when ICT-technology should help employees of the company to freely communicate 
and build networks with the outside world, and when arising new technologies need to 
be controlled,when arising questions and topics should be discussed and solved 
between the walls of the individual company.   
 
Within our perspective, we follow perspective of Jones et. al. (1999), is defined 
network governance as involving “a select, persistent, and structured set of 
autonomous firms (as well as nonprofit agencies) engaged in creating products or 
services based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental 
contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges” (Jones et. al. p…). They 
define conditions when network governance will be are should be developed.  
 
Our paper is structured as follows. Below [section 2], we will elaborate on the 
emerging developments within current economies, often coined as ‘new’- or network 
economy.  
 
Thereafter [section 3] we will elaborate on developments within corporate governance 
and the arising need for network governance, partly driven by new ICT solutionss. 
 
Within the fourth section, current development will be discussed that need network 
governance. 
 
In the fifth section, we develop a model in which new technologies can be assessed. 
Based on the characterstics of network governance, the model explains the various 
modes of governance necessary to deal with arising new technological opportunities. 
 
 
  
2. The Network Economy 
 
The term “network economy” is generally meant to denote the business environment that has 
emerged as a result from ubiquitous information technology allowing access to information 
anytime and anywhere, irrespective of time and location.  Some descriptions of this kind of 
environment have been described in a number of books, including those by Kelly (1998), 
Malone et al. (1998), Bloem and van Doorn (2006), Chesbrough et al. (2006), Fingar (2006) 
and Tapscott and Williams (2006).  
 
Traditionally, the different business functions within a company were located close to where 
the business dictated, e.g., close to prospective customers, resources, or the decision making 
unit of the company. The emergence of information technology and the global spread of access 
to the internet have allowed much more unconstrained location of business functions and of 
the individuals contributing to those functions, and ultimately the delegation of responsibilities 
for certain business functions to other organisations (outsourcing) and/or collections of more or 
less unorganised individuals (crowd sourcing).  
 
• Outsourcing: This is a fairly common practice, where – typically non-critical – 
business functions are handed over to an outside party.  One of the advantages of 
outsourcing is that it allows a company to focus on its key business processes. One 
example of an industry branch that has made extensive use of outsourcing is the 
automobile industry, where the production of many of the components of cars has been 
outsourced to different companies. Deciding which business processes are key and 
which are not has led in extreme cases to companies that focus themselves on only one 
business process, e.g. Nike which is essentially a – albeit very successful – marketing 
& sales organisation. 
• Crowd sourcing: An interesting phenomenon is the creation of products via the 
contribution of many – often without payment – professionals. Examples are the 
operating system Linux and the internet encyclopaedia Wikipedia. In these examples, a 
task is outsourced to a – often unspecified – group of individuals, i.e. the crowd, who 
then each contribute according to his or her interests and abilities. 
 
We are interested for the sake of this paper in situations where a business decides to 
perform part of its business endeavours via a temporary collaboration with other 
businesses and/or individuals. The governance of the involved IT is seen from the 
perspective of one business, i.e. the primary business that ultimately makes the sourcing 
decision. 
 
The network economy signifies a philosophy of innovation and entrepreneurship where 
multiple parties contribute according to their specific strengths. Although cost reduction is a 
typical primary objective of sourcing, other benefits derive from allocating functions to other 
 
 parties according to respective strengths, such as quality and innovative strength. The latter 
provided one allows outside parties to become contributors to innovation processes. This 
opening up of innovation processes to outside parties is also termed “open innovation”, see e.g. 
Chesbrough (2003). 
 
The basic underlying assumption in “open innovation” is that there is more creative and 
innovative talent outside a company than inside. This talent can be tapped by making the 
innovation platform of a business transparent. By combining outside ideas – including those of 
customers – with inside business models and development platforms, a business should be able 
to improve upon its innovative power. A current example are the Iphone Apps, where Apple 
has invited the general public to develop new applications for its Iphone and Ipod products, 
resulting in literally tens of thousands new applications developed by outsiders, but sold 
through Apple’s distribution channels.  
 
Table 1    Differences between Closed and Open Innovation 
Closed innovation Open innovation 
All relevant smart people work for the company There are more smart people outside than inside the 
company 
The company only profits from R&D when the company 
explores, invents and develops in house 
The company profits from other’s R&D. provided 
sufficient  
If the company invents something themselves, they will 
be first to market 
A company can profit from the inventions of others 
outside the company 
Whoever communicates an invention first, is the winner A good business model is more important than being 
first to market 
Those who have the most and brightest new ideas, wins Those who make the best use of anybody’s new 
ideas, wins 
A company has to protect intellectual property to 
prevent others from benefiting 
A company benefits from others using their 
intellectual property and a company should be able to 
use others’ intellectual property 
 
These examples have in common that business results, specifically innovation, are achieved by 
collaboration between temporarily and loosely coupled entities (other businesses and 
professional workers). The question that arises is: how does a business manage its ongoing 
business and innovation while adopting ways of working from the network economy and how 
does a business benefit from the network economy?  
 
Developments that are allowing businesses to allocate business functions to more suitable 
outside functions also are also responsible for a considerable change in the relationship 
between a company and its employees. Since the industrial revolution in Western economies, 
the role of businesses as primary providers of employment has been growing. Businesses had 
become by the end of the twentieth century relatively stable organisations with employees set 
on life-long employment. But the last decade, the number of self-employed professionals has 
been growing again (van den Born, 2009). While – on the one hand – companies want to be 
flexible in hiring and firing employees as ever faster market developments dictate, 
professionals – on the other hand – are becoming more aware of their value and are 
increasingly seeking interesting projects irrespective of the company commissioning the 
 
 project. As a consequence IT governance has to accommodate for an increasingly fleeting 
relationship between a business and the professionals it employs to pursue its business 
endeavours. 
 
3 Vanishing boundaries: Networks, Inter-organizational governance and IT 
 
When we assess corporate governance literature, governance is about the conflict of 
interest between various groups that are involved within a company. Within 1932, 
Berle & Means discussed the development of the modern firm in the United States. 
These big companies where owned by a large group of shareholders, but controlled by 
managers that had an own interest. Between shareholders (principals) and managers 
(agents) a critical conflict of interest existed, as Berle and Means claimed. Governance 
mechanisms should enable to create an optimal balance between the shareholder and 
the manager. Distrust, control, contracts and the need for transparency which would 
enable shareholders to make the management accountable – are key elements in this 
perspective. This so-called agency theory is still a guiding governments, managers and 
shareholders all over the world (De Graaf Williams 2009).  
 
New societal and technological developments have led to the arisen of network 
governance. Within  this perspective not the conflict of interest between principals and 
agents is central, but companies operate in networks which enables them to create 
‘products or services based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to 
environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges” (Jones et. al. 
p…).  
 
Network governance makes the world more complicated. Critical distinctions in 
business, for example between the inside and the outside of the company, seem to 
disappear. For example, within corporate governance theory, a distinction is made 
between internal governance, how the various parts of the company are structured and 
where decisions are made, and the external governance, how the company is dealing 
with stakeholders, for example shareholders and the government (Gillan 1998). 
 
A new theoretical starting point 
 
[[ELABORATE ON TABLE 1, The difference between agency and network 
governance]] 
 
Table 1. The difference between a traditional corporate governance and a 
network governance 
 Agency perspective on 
governance 
Network governance 
Unit of analysis Principal-agent Network of companies and 
other relevant organisations 
 
 Control system Contracts Reputation 
Market demand Stable and transparent High product demand 
uncertainty with stable 
supply 
Human Resources relations Based on stable contract 
settings 
Customised exchanges high 
in human asset specificity. 
Task characteristics Well defined tasks that lead 
to accountable results 
Complex tasks under 
intense time pressure which 
are difficult to assess by 
non-specialists 
Boundaries of the firm Clear and stable division of 
labour between costumer 
and supplier 
Frequent exchanges among 
parties. 
 
 
4. IT in organizations 
 
IT is pervasive in most companies, although in different roles and in varying degrees of 
requiring IT governance for their the company’s health. McAfee proposes a useful 
classification., by subdividing IT in three categories (McAfee, HBR): 
• Function IT: IT supporting the execution of discrete tasks, such as simulators and word 
processors 
• Network IT: IT facilitating interactions, such as email and social media 
• Enterprise IT: IT constituting business processes, such as ERP, CRM and supply chain 
management 
 
McAfee argues that Function IT requires no, or hardly any, executive involvement and 
therefore limited IT governance. From a network economy perspective 
 
Network IT on the one hand requires governance to set norms for the use of such IT and on the 
other to determine if and how Network IT can be used to perform tasks. Typically, employees 
start using Network IT such as social media and blogs on their own accord. When left 
unchecked completely, this may lead to undesirable leakage of information and damage to 
brand perception, for instance. Rules stipulating what can and what cannot be communicated 
will help to mitigate these risks. Furthermore, Network IT can be used as a tool to perform 
company tasks effectively, such as knowledge management and company-wide discussions 
towards developing a new strategy. 
 
Network governance (Jones et al., 1997) deals with this type of collaborative work. Network 
governance takes input from social network theory and transaction theory to understand the 
mechanisms involved that allow networked communities to achieve results and to safeguard 
information exchanges. Key elements to network governance are social embeddedness (i.e. 
 
 relationships are not just dyadic, but embedded in a network of relationships), informal social 
contracts, and reputation (i.e., some form of social commodity participants in a network seek 
to maximize).  An interesting question is whether these three elements can be tailored to 
“engineer” desired performance of a particular social network. 
 
Enterprise IT performs business processes, i.e. coincides with the way a company is doing 
business, and warrants therefore considerable attention to IT governance.  
Developments in IT and the network economy are also changing the conditions that drive the 
need for and approaches to IT governance. For long, IT governance would be considered as an 
internal governance issue. However, technical and economic opportunities make various IT 
solutions currently an issue of external governance also. For example, technical advancements 
allow processes such as customer relationship management and payrolling increasingly to be 
implemented using solutions based on cloud computing. This introduces dependence on 
resources and functionality developed and maintained outside the organization. A step further 
is outsourcing of responsibility for executing processes to other organizations, possibly even 
abroad, to organizations not owned or controlled by those companies.  
 
These examples also illustrate that there exist varying degrees of delegation in Enterprise IT. 
We argue that these varying degrees require also varying governance systems, ranging 
between agency governance and network governance. Certain outsourcing relationships 
dealing with clearly defined, compartmentalized business processes, are very well suited for an 
agency approach, including formal and stable contracts, well-defined tasks and accountable 
results, and a clear division of labour between customer and supplier. On the other end of the 
spectrum, we see relationships that are better suited for a network governance approach. These 
are relationships as defined in Phases 3 (supplier management) and 4 (collaborative 
innovation) in the Global Sourcing Learning Curve of Willcocks and Craig (Willcocks & 
Craig, 2008). We discuss several models that help assess whether a certain process and 
relationship is better addressed via an agency or a network governance approach. 
 
The first model is based on (Ibrahim & Robbers, 2009). This paper discusses IT governance 
w.r.t. interorganizational cooperations and discuss the two notions competence trust and 
openness trust. Competence trust denotes the level of confidence one has in the competences 
of, in this case, a supplier. Outsourced tasks that require only low competence trust are those 
tasks that are common and not very well developed. Information trust denotes the level of 
confidence that a counterpart will handle information relevant to the relationship with 
transparency and equity. This in turn supports intensified collaboration and innovation.  
 
Network governance appears most suited for tasks with high competence trust and high 
openness trust requirements. Such tasks require partners with established, but rare 
competences that contribute in an open, explorative style on the development of systems and 
processes.  
 
  
 
Another model is derived from Kraljic’s procurement matrix (1983). This matrix uses the two 
axes supply risk and profit impact. In our adaptation supply risk is translated as specificity. 
The rationale being that the more specific a task is, the fewer potential suppliers there are and 
the higher the supply risk is. Profit impact is translated into added value to encompass benefits 
that are not purely financial and do require executive attention, thus governance. In Kraljic’s 
matrix, generic and low value contributions are related to commodities. Typically, those  can 
be addressed wel by formal contracts and an agency governance approach. Contributions that 
are specific, require substantial investment in a close collaboration which is only affordable if 
the contribution has sufficient added value. It could be argued that a task with high specificity, 
but low in added value should not be addressed at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. A model to assess Network IT within inter-organizational coordination and 
innovation 
 
 
 In this paper we combine current theory on network governance (Jones et. al. 1997), 
with new insights within interorganizational cooperation within IT-governance 
(Ibrahim & Ribbers 2009). 
 
 
 
Competence trust orientation  determined by:  Human asset specifity 
       Task Uncertainty 
 
Openness trust orientation determined by:   Demand Uncertainty 
       Frequency 
 
 
Based on our matrix, decision makers can decide how much competence trust and 
openness trust is necessary and what kind of governance measures are necessary. 
Also, we present more insights of the role the institutional environment in determining 
whether inter-organizational cooperation will be successful. 
 
 
 
 
IT Competence trust matrix: When is trust in competences and openness relevant 
in IT governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logic:  
High trust on competences (needed) means high human asset specifity and 
task Uncertainty (Example Ipod apps) 
Core business 
Openness trust 
Functional task 
(outsource?) 
Competence trust 
Arising potential new core business 
Finding the missing 
part of the IT-puzzle 
 
 Low trust on competences (needed) means simple tasks that can be easily 
performed and ensured 
High trust on openness (needed) means that it is uncertain how the demand 
will look like in detail and that the solution hardly can be found, the frequency 
that the solution will appear (example Android solution found in Waskemeer, 
small village in the North of the Netherlands) 
 Low trust on openness (needed) means that it is easy to formulate the demand 
and to fill it, normally the tasks are easy to fullfill and have a repeated 
character.   
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